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The Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCVP) offers choice to poor renter households,  
but only a fraction of the households in the program use that choice to locate in low-
poverty neighborhoods. Analysis of metropolitan areas across the United States finds 
that the typical metropolitan area locates 19 percent of its HCVP households in census 
tracts where less than 10 percent of the population is impoverished. This rate is less than 
the share of units with rents low enough for the program found in these low-poverty tracts. 
Race and ethnicity matter. Non-Hispanic White HCVP households are able to enter low- 
poverty neighborhoods at a rate greater than the availability of affordable units, whereas  
minorities are not. The metropolitan areas differ markedly in the per centage of HCVP 
households who locate in low-poverty tracts. Greater entry into low-poverty tracts is 
found in soft markets and markets with a high percentage of total tracts that are low-
poverty tracts. The level of the Fair Market Rents (FMRs), which govern the HCVP, 
also proves to influence the level of voucher entry into low-poverty neighborhoods, 
 suggesting that gains could be realized by localized changes to the FMRs.
Introduction
The Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCVP) is the nation’s largest rental housing assistance pro-
gram. It helps 2.2 million households and more than 5 million people (HUD, 2012). This program 
is characterized in its subsidy delivery by the choice given to the participating household. With 




constrained. The household must reside where the assisted housing is located to gain the benefits. 
The HCVP permits the household to locate any place the household can find a unit that will pass 
physical inspection and is offered at rents that are within the program limits.
The program works well (Turner, 2003). It generates high levels of satisfaction among its participa-
ting households, especially among those households that use HCVP to move to neighborhoods 
with low crime rates and improved access to services (Briggs and Turner, 2006; Comey, Briggs, 
and Weismann, 2008; Varady and Walker, 2003). Very low-income households given vouchers are 
less likely to suffer from a high housing cost burden and are more likely to live in quality housing 
than their poor counterparts (HUD, 2000). By far most voucher households pay 30 percent of 
their incomes on housing. About one in six households pays more than 40 percent of its income 
on housing, and although doing so is not permitted in the program’s rules, the problem appears to 
be because of short-term fluctuations in income rather than an inability of the program to accom-
modate variations in the marketplace (McClure, 2005).
The program is understood to have both income and substitution effects (Jacob and Ludwig, 2008; 
Shroder, 2002). The voucher augments income, but the increased income, coming in the form of a 
voucher, is not fungible; it must be used for housing. This restriction generates some distortion in  
the recipient household’s consumption decisions. The voucher also influences employment decisions. 
In the HCVP, the rent is set at 30 percent of income, which means that any increase in income 
through additional employment will generate an automatic increase in rent, discouraging additional 
employment. Researchers disagree on the magnitude of this substitution effect, with opinions rang-
ing from effectively nil to as much as a 4-percent reduction in labor force participation.
The program is relatively efficient. Nearly all the federal tax expenditure goes into the consumption of 
housing. The public housing authorities (PHAs) that administer the program do so on a shoestring 
budget (Henriquez, 2013). The program serves the poorest of the poor; the typical HCVP house-
hold has an income placing it at 22 percent of the Area Median Family Income (McClure, 2005). 
The program makes the consumption of good-quality housing affordable for these participating 
households.
Among the program’s successes is that it helps some households locate in low-poverty census tracts, 
although the number of such households is fewer than we might expect given the availability of units 
(McClure, 2008). Two aspects of this movement to low-poverty tracts remain unknown: What 
explains the variation among metropolitan areas in the percentage of HCVP households entering 
into low-poverty tracts? What does this variation imply for expanding the use of vouchers in a 
poverty-deconcentration effort? The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
establishes a Fair Market Rent (FMR) for each metropolitan area that generally does not vary across 
a metropolitan area. The availability of rental units at rents less than the FMR, however, may vary 
considerably across a metropolitan area and between low- and high-poverty tracts. Do the limita-
tions imposed through the FMRs inhibit entry of voucher holders into low-poverty areas? The 
research in this article attempts to explain the variation among metropolitan areas in terms of how 
well HCVP households are able to locate in low-poverty neighborhoods and tests the hypothesis 
that the level of the FMRs influences this process.
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Using vouchers as a vehicle for deconcentrating poor households is not an articulated goal of the  
HCVP. The Section 8 Management Assessment Program (SEMAP) evaluates the performance of each 
PHA that administers the HCVP. Each PHA is given points for performance across 14 administrative 
areas, leading to a total performance score. Each PHA is given additional points if more of its HCVP  
households locate in tracts with lower poverty levels (HUD, 2013). Adding points to a PHA’s SEMAP  
rating is, at best, a very minimal endorsement of the goal of poverty deconcentration. Moving poor  
households out of neighborhoods with high poverty levels and into neighborhoods with low poverty  
levels is, however, at least implicitly found in two rental assistance experiments supported by HUD.
The first experiment was the Gautreaux initiative. This program was born out of a court settle-
ment, but it was, in effect, a quasi-experiment in the use of vouchers to promote racial integration 
(Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 2000). The effort offered a set of low-income, inner-city households 
a voucher with the condition that, to receive the voucher, each household must move to a racially 
integrated, suburban neighborhood. Although its purpose was racial integration, the high correla-
tion between concentrated poverty and the presence of racial minorities meant that the Gautreaux 
experiment became a poverty deconcentration initiative in addition to its stated purpose of correc-
ting past racial segregation. The households given vouchers with the requirement that they move to 
a racially integrated neighborhood were compared with another set of households given vouchers 
without a restriction on the neighborhoods where they could locate. Surveys of participants in-
dicated that those households that moved to suburban locations were 16 percentage points more 
likely to have a job after they moved, although they did not work more hours or earn higher wages 
(Rosenbaum, 1995). Survey results also indicated that the children in the households that moved 
to the integrated suburbs were more likely to stay in school, to be employed after graduation, and 
to go on to 4-year colleges or universities (Popkin et al., 2000).
The results from the Gautreaux program were always suspect because of the problem of self-
selection of the households that moved to the suburbs. The households that entered the program 
volunteered for participation knowing the requirement to move to the racially integrated suburbs. 
These households also knew that they would be subject to more stringent screening for past crimi-
nal behavior, for past performance in paying rent in a timely manner, and for care of the rental 
unit. This screening could have caused the movers to the suburbs to be a different population than 
the households that chose unrestricted vouchers.
Given the doubts that researchers expressed with the Gautreaux results and the desire to learn more  
about how to deconcentrate poor households, the Gautreaux initiative fostered HUD’s Moving 
to Opportunity (MTO) for Fair Housing Demonstration (Goering, Feins, and Richardson, 2003). 
This second effort sought poverty deconcentration very explicitly, and the criteria for selecting a 
neighborhood did not contain a racial component. HUD offered a set of low-income households in 
five test cities vouchers with the condition that the household must locate in a census tract with a  
poverty rate of less than 10 percent, with no restrictions on the tract’s racial composition or location  
in the central city or suburbs. The households were surveyed repeatedly during a period of years. 
The quality of their housing, employment, and health were assessed, as were their educational 




lived in public housing and of other households given vouchers but without any constraints on the 
poverty level in the neighborhood where they chose to locate. The MTO program had the distinct 
advantage over the Gautreaux program in that it was carefully designed to be an experiment. Efforts  
were taken to ensure that the experimental group (households given vouchers with the restriction 
that they move to low-poverty neighborhoods) could be compared directly with a control group 
who stayed in public housing and a control group offered vouchers without restriction on where 
they could move.
The results of the MTO program were mixed. Reviews of the experiment come from different 
sources. The final report to HUD by a team of researchers outlines the outcomes in some detail 
(Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011). For an ethnographic study of MTO households in three of the five 
 cities, see Briggs, Popkin, and Goering (2010). A recent issue of Cityscape, edited by Ludwig (2012),  
not only covers the outcomes for the participating households but also reviews the experimental 
design, its implications from an international perspective, and possible policy responses.
A basic measure of the success of the MTO program is found in the percentage of households that  
were able to successfully lease a housing unit in a low-poverty tract and continue to reside in a 
low-poverty tract over time. The results indicate that it is not easy; only about one-half of the 
households that entered the program were successful at doing so (Shroder and Orr, 2012).
For those households that successfully entered the program, specific outcomes were examined 
across the five cities during a long period. The positive outcomes were limited but important. Gains  
for participating households were found in the health benefits realized by adults. MTO adults had 
a lower incidence of diabetes, extreme obesity, physical limitations, and psychological distress than  
did adults in the control groups. Many of these positive health benefits are associated with movement  
away from crime-intensive areas and into relatively crime-free areas. Reducing the stress resulting 
from a fear of crime appears to have beneficial physical and mental health effects (Sanbonmatsu 
et al., 2012). Neutral outcomes, even a few negative results, were found in the many tests made 
for hypothesized outcomes. For youths in the program, the study found few detectable benefits 
(Gennetian et al., 2012). Schooling outcomes were no different between those households that 
moved to low-poverty tracts and those that did not, even for those children who were of preschool 
age when they entered the program. The MTO program also had few detectable effects on physical 
health outcomes for young people. Where favorable outcomes were found, they tended to be 
among female youth, particularly on mental health outcomes. Less favorable patterns were found 
among male youth (Gennetian et al., 2012). The MTO program generated few effects on economic 
well-being, as measured through employ ment, earnings, household income, and the receipt of 
government assistance programs such as food stamps or Temporary Aid to Needy Families (San-
bonmatsu et al., 2012). Turner (2012: 215) offered, “One possible reason that MTO gains were 
limited to health outcomes is that the special mobility assistance provided by the demonstration 
did not enable families to gain and sustain access to high-opportunity neighborhoods.” Success 
apparently takes more than a voucher and a directive to move to a tract with a poverty rate of less 
than 10 percent.
Even with this mixed success, calls have been made to ramp up efforts to use the HCVP as a 
mechanism to foster greater poverty deconcentration. Polikoff (2006) proposed that 50,000 
Which Metropolitan Areas Work Best for 
Poverty Deconcentration With Housing Choice Vouchers?
213Cityscape
vouchers be set aside each year for 10 years for MTO-style placement. The thrust of Polikoff’s 
proposal is more focused on racial integration than on poverty discrimination, because he would 
limit these vouchers to African-American households that would move to low-poverty and low-
minority census tracts. If implemented, this initiative could mean that 500,000 households relocate 
within a decade, meaning that as many as one in every four or five vouchers would be constrained 
for use in low-poverty areas. Briggs and Turner (2006) suggested that this proposal was slightly 
premature, because we do not yet know enough about what constitutes a desirable neighborhood 
for HCVP families. They proposed identifying high-opportunity neighborhoods to which voucher 
households would be guided. They argued that the identification of high-opportunity neighbor-
hoods should assess the neighborhoods’ safety, quality of schools, and access to jobs suitable to 
the assisted households. It is unfortunate that researchers find little agreement on what constitutes 
a high-opportunity neighborhood (McClure, 2010). At minimum, we can examine the extent to 
which HCVP families move to low-poverty neighborhoods and the variation among metropolitan 
areas in placing these households in low-poverty tracts.
Several studies evaluate the HCVP and its capacity to move households to high-opportunity 
neighborhoods. Pendall (2000), Basolo and Nguyen (2005), McClure (2010), and Galvez (2010) 
all examined the extent to which households with vouchers are able to locate in low-poverty tracts. 
All found that HCVP households are less likely to live in distressed, high-poverty neighborhoods 
than are other poor renter households but are more likely to do so than all renter households. All 
authors found that race is a factor; racial and ethnic minorities are less able to enter low-poverty 
tracts and are more concentrated in high-poverty tracts.
Devine et al. (2003) examined the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the nation to determine where 
HCVP households locate. Their study found that nearly 30 percent of HCVP households live in 
neighborhoods with a poverty rate of less than 10 percent and that 22 percent live in tracts with 
a poverty rate of more than 30 percent. To some extent, successful location in low-poverty areas 
is a function of living in suburbs versus living in central cities. More than one-third of central-city 
HCVP households live in tracts with poverty rates of more than 30 percent, but only 6 percent of 
suburban households live in high-poverty tracts. Race and ethnicity are factors; African-American 
and Hispanic households are more likely than White households to live in neighborhoods where 
poverty is concentrated, and White households are more likely than minority households to live in 
low-poverty tracts.
Galvez (2010) added a temporal component, finding that, although racial disparities persist, African 
Americans made modest gains over time, whereas Whites lost ground. Feins and Patterson (2005) 
found a tendency of HCVP households to make a sequence of moves from one year to the next, 
improving their neighborhood quality in terms of concentrated poverty.
The scale of the neighborhood matters. Nearly all these studies examined census tracts. Tracts can 
be too large, however, sufficiently large that clusters of HCVP households can form within tracts. 
These clusters can defeat the intended purpose of poverty deconcentration (Wang and Varady, 
2005). Reconcentration of poor households can be a problem independent of the scale of the 
spatial unit of analysis. Hartung and Henig (1997) found that market forces and personal choices 
may cause HCVP households to cluster, creating new concentrations of poor households, even in 




This body of research suggests that the HCVP is helping some households to successfully locate in 
low-poverty neighborhoods. Mandatory requirements that the participating household must move 
to a low-poverty tract were found to be less than successful. The MTO program may have suffered 
from being “a good idea weakly implemented” (Briggs, Popkin, and Goering, 2010). Most MTO 
households stayed in tracts within the same school district (Orr et al., 2003). Meeting the require-
ment to move to a tract with a poverty rate of less than 10 percent did not compel movement to an 
economically and racially integrated tract offering good employment prospects or high-performing 
schools. Moving households away from crime did produce some health benefits, but no economic 
benefits. A spatial element exists; suburbs show greater success than do central cities at providing 
housing in low-poverty tracts, but the generation of new poverty clusters remains a problem. 
Unanswered in this work is an exploration of how well HCVP households enter low-poverty tracts 
without an MTO mandate. Does the rate vary across metropolitan areas? What might explain the 
variation? Pendall (2000) specifically noted that market softness drives the process. Softer rental 
markets—those with greater vacancy rates—facilitate dispersal of poor households. Devine et al. 
(2003) found that the 50 largest metropolitan areas provide entry to low-poverty tracts at levels 
somewhat better than was true for the program as a whole, suggesting that larger metropolitan 
areas may be doing a better job. Does this finding mean that the scale of the market matters? Do 
larger metropolitan areas facilitate movement into low-poverty tracts? McClure (2010) found that 
the level of the FMR influences the number of units eligible for use by participating households. 
If the metropolitan area’s FMRs are more relative to market rents, does that facilitate entry into 
low-poverty tracts? This variable is the key test variable for this analysis, because it is within the 
domain of policy. HUD can do little about the size of the market where the HCVP operates or the 
vacancy rate. It can adjust the FMR if that adjustment could prove beneficial to helping deconcen-
trate poor households.
Data and Analysis
To help our understanding of where HCVP households choose to locate, this analysis examines 
metropolitan areas across the nation. The examination seeks to explain the variation in the shares 
of HCVP households in each metropolitan area that locate in low-poverty neighborhoods.
For this analysis, I prepared a national dataset at the census tract level from 2005–09 American 
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year data. Approximately 65,000 tracts exist nationwide, but this analysis 
is limited to the 51,000 located in the nation’s 276 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The typi-
cal tract contains about 2,000 housing units, about 660 of them for renters. In this study, census 
tracts are viewed as neighborhoods. The data indicate that the average poverty level among metro-
politan tracts is 14.6 percent, but that this poverty level is not normally distributed (see exhibit 1). 
Rather, most neighborhoods have relatively low poverty levels, and a small share suffer from very 
high poverty levels. About one-half of all tracts have poverty rates of less than 10 percent, whereas 
only about 6 percent of all metropolitan tracts have poverty rates of 40 percent or more.
For purposes of this study, a low-poverty neighborhood is defined as one with less than 10 percent 
poverty. This number is arbitrary, and others could have been chosen, but several arguments 
exist for using the median figure of 10 percent. First, it narrows the population of neighborhoods 
to those that are better than the 15-percent average, rather than including many that are about 
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average and perhaps less desirable as locations for HCVP households. Second, the number of 
neighborhoods available with poverty rates less than the 10-percent threshold is ample for the 
HCVP. One-half of all neighborhoods fit this standard, providing a great many rental housing 
units. Third, MTO adopted this threshold for its experimental program, and it was found to be 
workable. Not all applicant households were able to find units, but overall, the program was able 
to operate with households finding units meeting this requirement. Finally, the 10-percent level 
is comfortably less than the 15-percent threshold suggested by Galster (2005), less than which 
incremental growth in poverty has no negative effect on the receiving neighborhood.
I merged 2010 HUD administrative data with the ACS tract data. These data provide counts of 
households in the HCVP for each tract and describe about 2.08 million households. Only about 
0.5 percent of the reported HCVP households could not be located in a tract, a very minimal loss 
of data. Note also that only vouchers in place are counted. At any given time, many vouchers are 
either in the process of being awarded to households on the waiting list or have been awarded but 
the household is still looking for a unit. Of these 2.08 million households, 1.78 million (85 per-
cent) locate in metropolitan areas. It is these HCVP households that reside in metropolitan tracts 
that form the population for this study.
Descriptive Analysis of the Data
In general, the level of entry into low-poverty metropolitan areas by HCVP households is less than 






Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-Poverty Neighborhoods for 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Percent





Percent of neighborhoods with poverty below 10 percent 43.9
Percent of rental units in low-poverty neighborhoods 32.8
Percent of rental units offered for less than Fair Market Rent in low-poverty neighborhoods 26.1
HCVP = Housing Choice Voucher Program. N = 276.
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development HCVP data, 2010; 2005–09 American Community Survey 
5-year data
Among the 276 metropolitan areas examined, 19 percent of all HCVP households locate in low-
poverty tracts. This measure of HCVP entry into low-poverty tracts is normally distributed, with a 
standard deviation of 12 percentage points. The range is broad, with the lowest poverty metropoli-
tan area at less than 1 percent and the highest poverty at 68 percent.
The interpretation of this 19-percent figure depends on the counterfactual employed. Compared 
with the number of low-poverty tracts, entry by HCVP participants is minimal. Whereas 19 percent 
of voucher households enter into low-poverty tracts, a much greater 44 percent of all metropolitan 
tracts qualify as low poverty. Thus, the voucher households are not distributed as would be expected 
if vouchers were evenly distributed across all tracts.
The scarcity of rental units may be partly to blame. Rental units are not distributed across the metro - 
politan tracts of the nation in a manner that is independent of the poverty level. Because the renter 
population is poorer than the owner population, rental units are more concentrated in moderate-  
and high-poverty tracts. Low-poverty tracts comprise nearly one-half of all neighborhoods, but 
they contain only 33 percent of all rental units. The HCVP gives mobility to the participating 
households, but the households cannot move to tracts where rental units do not exist.
Even where rental units exist, not all rental units are admissible into the HCVP. Rents are limited 
by the FMRs published by HUD. PHAs are granted some discretion to vary the program’s payment 
standards, which set the maximum amount of subsidy a household may receive. The FMR is, for 
most PHAs, set at the 40th percentile of rents in the metropolitan area. The payment standard is 
the maximum amount that a PHA will pay in support of a household. If the payment standard is 
set too low, households will have trouble finding units. If the payment standard is set too high, 
fewer households will be able to be assisted with the available program funds. To accommodate 
these problems, HUD permits PHAs to set payment standards for each unit size category at as low 
as 90 percent or as high as 110 percent of the FMR. Where extraordinary circumstances exist, 
HUD can permit PHAs to vary the payment standards further (HUD, 2001).
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FMRs are generally the 40th percentile of rent paid by recent movers. Because they were set less 
than the median for new mover rents, and because rents for units without turnover tend to be 
less, the FMRs and the median gross rents in markets roughly align. Variation exists, however, for 
a variety of reasons. Some markets may use FMRs set at the 50th percentile through a provision 
granting higher rents to help HCVP households find and lease decent and affordable housing in 
high-cost markets. Some markets may have very high or very low turnover rates, causing variation 
in the spread between the FMRs and the typical rents in the market. Some markets may have FMRs 
that are much less than market rents because of a high incidence of new or luxurious housing, which 
HUD excludes from its data. Some metropolitan areas are split with multiple FMRs. All these reasons  
can contribute to variation between the FMRs and the median gross rents in a metropolitan area. 
This variation permits testing of the influence of different FMR levels on the capacity of HCVP 
households to locate in low-poverty tracts.
The rent limits imposed by the program therefore vary in each metropolitan area, but the FMRs 
loosely govern the program. They provide a good estimate of the availability of units that can enter  
into the program. The low level of entry of HCVP households into low-poverty neighborhoods may  
be a function of the absence of rental units offered for less than the FMR. Although 33 percent of 
rental units are located in low-poverty neighborhoods, only 26 percent of the rental units offered 
for less than the FMR are found in those neighborhoods. A rental housing price effect appears to 
correlate strongly with the incidence of poverty. Less-than-FMR units are not found in low-poverty 
neighborhoods in the same proportion as low-poverty neighborhoods are among all neighborhoods.
These conclusions are sensitive to the decision to use 10 percent as the threshold for inclusion in 
the low-poverty category of neighborhoods. If the threshold is raised to 15 percent, the problems of 
dissimilar distributions are significantly reduced. Thus, the category of neighborhoods with poverty 
rates of between 10 and 15 percent contain a great deal of rental housing, much of it priced less 
than the FMR. These neighborhoods with moderate amounts of poverty would not be considered 
good recipient neighborhoods for poor households with HCVP assistance, however, because the 
neighborhoods could be harmed by incremental increases in impoverished households, pushing 
them into above average poverty levels. Thus, the analysis continues with only those neighborhoods 
with poverty rates of less than 10 percent.
As a baseline, we can expect that 19 percent of voucher households will locate in low-poverty areas 
under the standard administration of the HCVP; that is, with only very minimal encouragement 
to PHAs to guide HCVP households to low-poverty tracts and with no effort to impose an MTO 
requirement at a national scale. This 19-percent entry into low-poverty tracts is 14 percentage 
points less than the availability of rental units and 7 percentage points less than the availability of 
units offered for less than the FMR.
Spatial Variation in the Percentage of HCVP Households 
Entering Low-Poverty Tracts
Metropolitan areas vary considerably in terms of the percentage of HCVP households entering into 
low-poverty neighborhoods. Exhibit 3 illustrates this variation. Of the 276 metropolitan statistical 




entering low-poverty neighborhoods, but 25 (9 percent) averaged greater than 35 percent (roughly 
twice the national average) entering low-poverty neighborhoods. The East South Central and West 
South Central division states and the Central Valley of California appear to have a high incidence 
of metropolitan areas averaging very low levels of HCVP entry into low-poverty neighborhoods. 
The northern Plains and New England division states appear to have a high incidence of metro-
politan areas averaging very high levels.
Exhibit 3 suggests that region influences the level of HCVP entry into low-poverty tracts in the 
various metropolitan areas. Exhibit 4 breaks down the metropolitan areas by census region and 
division.
Metropolitan areas in the West and the Midwest regions seem to operate on par with the nation, at 
about 21 percent. The Northeast region averages more, at 24 percent, and the South region aver-
ages less, at only 14 percent.
Exhibit 3
Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Census Tracts With Poverty Rates of Less 
Than 10 Percent in Metropolitan Statistical Areas
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HCVP = Housing Choice Voucher Program.
Which Metropolitan Areas Work Best for 
Poverty Deconcentration With Housing Choice Vouchers?
219Cityscape
Exhibit 4
Average Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-Poverty Neighborhoods by 









Northeast  24.4  35 
New England  28.6  11 
Middle Atlantic  22.4  24 
Midwest  21.2 73
East North Central  18.8 45
West North Central  25.2 28
South  14.5 118
South Atlantic  18.4 53
East South Central  11.9 24
West South Central  10.9 41
West  21.2 50
Mountain  22.6 23
Pacific  19.9 27
All metropolitan statistical areas  18.7 276
HCVP = Housing Choice Voucher Program.
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development HCVP data, 2010; 2005–09 American Community Survey 
5-year data
Looking one step closer, exhibit 4 refines the analysis into the nine census divisions, providing 
slightly more clarity. The New England division averages the most HCVP entry into low-poverty 
tracts, at 29 percent. The West North Central division, made up of the Plains states of Iowa, Kan-
sas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, is next, at 25 percent. The 
East South Central division (Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Tennessee) falls near the bottom. 
The West South Central division (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) averages the least, at 
11 percent.
Washington, D.C., locates 44 percent of its HCVP households in low-poverty tracts, the highest 
level of entry among large metropolitan areas. This metropolitan area is in the South region, which 
does not fit the pattern. The second highest level, also 44 percent, does fit the pattern; it occurs 
in Las Vegas in the Mountain division of the West Region. The lowest levels of entry are found in 
the McAllen (less than 1 percent) and the El Paso (1.3 percent) metropolitan areas in Texas. Both 
are in the West South Central division, which fits the pattern of the South region averaging lower 
levels of entry than elsewhere.
Exhibit 5 identifies the greatest and least averages among larger metropolitan areas; that is, those 
with a population of greater than 800,000. The metropolitan areas with the most average place-
ments of HCVP households in low-poverty tracts are not the ones that were expected. Washington, 
D.C., and San Francisco averaged among the highest levels of entry. Both areas are known for their  
high-priced, very competitive housing markets, attributes one would not typically associate with 
income integration. The metropolitan areas with the lowest levels of entry include the Fresno and  




metropolitan area with low average entry, saw its real estate bubble burst, which may be a factor,  
but the Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV MSA, also with a burst bubble, is among the metropolitan 
statistical areas with greatest average entry of HCVP households into low-poverty neighborhoods. 
(The appendix lists all metropolitan areas by their level of entry.)
The HCVP is administered relatively uniformly across the country. PHAs have some discretion 
in how they administer the program, but for the most part, no obvious reason explains why the 
program performs so differently across the nation. What then explains the variation?
Racial and Ethnic Variation in the Percentage of HCVP 
Households Entering Low-Poverty Neighborhoods
The previous studies of HCVP location patterns suggest that the racial and ethnic composition of 
the population being served influences the capacity of the HCVP household to locate in low-poverty 
tracts. If the program and the housing markets are neutral to race and ethnicity, the analysis should 
find the same percentage of HCVP households entering low-poverty neighborhoods across all racial  
and ethnic groups. In this study, non-Hispanic Whites are referred to as Whites, and non-Hispanic 
African Americans are referred to as African Americans. Hispanics of any race are referred to as Hispanics.
Exhibit 6 shows this parity not to be the case. The exhibit examines all voucher households in met-
ropolitan areas. Across 1.8 million metropolitan voucher households nationwide, 21 percent reside 
in low-poverty neighborhoods, slightly more than the mean of 19 percent found when averaging 
the 276 metropolitan areas. Because large metropolitan areas tend to place more HCVP households 
in low-poverty tracts, the smaller metropolitan areas bias the average percent of HCVP households 
to locate in low-poverty tracts among metropolitan areas downward.
Exhibit 5
Best and Worst Performing Large MSAs
MSA




Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 43.5
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 42.6
Urban Honolulu, HI 40.4
Boston-Worcester-Providence, MA-RI-NH-CT 36.9
Salt Lake City, UT 35.2
Worst performing MSAs
New Orleans-Metairie, LA 9.4
Tulsa, OK 8.9
Fresno, CA 6.7
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 6.1
Bakersfield, CA 5.2
Average for all MSAs 18.7
HCVP = Housing Choice Voucher Program. MSA = metropolitan statistical area. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development HCVP data, 2010; 2005–09 American Community Survey 
5-year data
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About 30 percent of White households locate in low-poverty neighborhoods. Note that this 30- 
percent level approaches the 35 percent of rental units that are in low-poverty neighborhoods, 
which suggests that the HCVP provides the income augmentation to enable poor White house-
holds to compete successfully with nonpoor renter households in the market. It is important to 
note that the 30 percent entry by Whites exceeds the percentage of rental units with rents less 
than the FMR (26 percent) that are in low-poverty neighborhoods. This disproportionately high 
percentage of market entry by Whites means that, with housing choice vouchers, they are able to 
enter these desirable markets and compete for units against unsubsidized households, including 
households of much higher income levels.
Among minorities, the level of entry is predictably lower. About 17 percent of African Americans 
and 16 percent of Hispanics locate in low-poverty neighborhoods, levels much lower than their 
White counterparts. The level of minority entry is lower than the supply of rental units and the 
supply of units with rents less than the FMR. The 13-percentage-point differential between White 
and African-American households is substantial if taste for living in low-poverty tracts is the 
same. The 14-percentage-point difference between White and Hispanic households is similarly 
substantial.
If the share of African Americans and Hispanics living in low-poverty neighborhoods were the same  
as for Whites, about 103,000 additional African-American HCVP households (12 percent of the 
 total) and 41,000 additional Hispanic households (14 percent of the total) would live in low-poverty 
neighborhoods. Race and ethnicity clearly influence the ability of HCVP households to locate in 
low-poverty neighborhoods. This issue may factor into the variation among metropolitan areas.
As is so often the case in studies of this type, it is unclear if discrimination or self-selection lies 
behind the different spatial distributions households by racial or ethnic group. Hispanics may 
self-select a level of segregation to accommodate a need to live where Spanish language services 
are provided. With any minority, it is difficult to distinguish among overt discrimination, fear of 
Exhibit 6
















White HCVP households  586,924  173,765 29.6
African-American HCVP 
households
 835,870  144,112 17.2 103,356  12.4 
Hispanic HCVP households  299,581  47,583 15.9 41,111  13.7 
Other race/ethnic group HCVP 
households
 57,729  15,669 27.1 1,422  2.5 
All HCVP households in MSAs  1,780,104  381,129 21.4 145,889  8.2
HCVP = Housing Choice Voucher Program. MSA = metropolitan statistical area.
* The number of additional HCVP households from each minority category who would locate in tracts with poverty rates below 
10 percent if each minority group entered these low-poverty tracs at the same 30-percent rate as Whites.





discrimination, and self-selection based on a preference for living in a neighborhood with a high 
percentage of the same minority group. These forces cannot be separated with the data available to 
this study.
Models Explaining Variation in the Percentage of HCVP 
Households Among Metropolitan Areas
The exploratory analysis confirms variation among metropolitan areas in terms of the level of entry  
that HCVP households make into low-poverty tracts. Region of the nation, scale of the metropolitan  
area, and the racial and ethnic identity of the voucher household all appear to influence this process. 
The softness of the market plays a role, as does the share of tracts that qualify as low-poverty tracts. 
HUD can do little about these factors, but it can adjust the FMR levels that guide the implementa-
tion of the program. Higher FMRs could make more units eligible for HCVP households and could 
increase the level of entry by these households.
To test the validity of this concept and to see if higher FMRs do result in greater HCVP entry into 
low-poverty tracts, I prepared models to explain the variation across the metropolitan areas.1 The 
first model includes all HCVP households, independent of race or ethnicity. Three additional mod-
els help to highlight the different location patterns of White HCVP households, African-American 
HCVP households, and Hispanic HCVP households. Exhibit 7 lists the descriptive statistics for the 
variables in these models.
The dependent variable for these models is the percentage of HCVP households that locate in tracts 
with less than 10 percent poverty. The unit of analysis is the metropolitan area, covering the 276  
metropolitan areas for which complete data are available. The models contain independent control 
variables describing various characteristics of the various markets. These variables include market 
scale, testing whether larger markets operate differently. Scale is measured by the size of the popu-
lation. Another important measure of a market’s capacity to absorb HCVP households is the num-
ber of low-poverty neighborhoods relative to the whole. It is expected that a greater share of total 
tracts that have poverty rates of less than 10 percent will result in greater entry into such tracts.
Market softness, measured as the difference between the vacancy rate in the low-poverty neigh-
borhoods and the metropolitan market as a whole, is also expected to influence the process. This 
approach is used because a household’s location decision is driven by the relative vacancy between 
the low-poverty neighborhoods and the remainder of the neighborhoods. It would be expected 
that if vacancy rates are greater in low-poverty neighborhoods than in the market as a whole, it 
would be easier for HCVP households to locate in the low-poverty neighborhoods.
1 The dependent variable is a proportion, constrained by a low of 0 and a high of 1, which can violate the assumptions of 
regression. The dependent variable, however, is fairly normally distributed, with a mean of 19 percent and with a standard 
deviation of 12 percentage points. The minimum is 0.4 percent and the maximum is 68.0 percent. The distribution does 
not include any significant frequencies at the extremes; rather, nearly all the cases are normally distributed away from the 
extremes. This distribution makes a linear form of the dependent variable defensible.
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Race is known to influence the capacity of minorities to locate freely across metropolitan markets. 
To control for the capacity to locate, two dissimilarity indexes are included in the models. The first 
measures the spatial differences between Whites and African Americans, and the second measures 
the spatial differences between Whites and Hispanics.2
No obvious reason explains why region of the nation should matter, but it clearly does. As such, 
dummy variables are entered for region. These regional variables serve as controls for other fixed 
effects that are unobserved in the available data.
Exhibit 7





 Percent of all HCVP households to neighborhoods with poverty rates of less 
than 10%
18.73 11.70
Percent of White HCVP households to neighborhoods with poverty rates of less 
than 10% 
23.81 13.65
Percent of African-American HCVP households to neighborhoods with poverty 
rates of less than 10%
15.23 11.48
Percent of Hispanic HCVP households to neighborhoods with poverty rates of 
less than 10%
19.29 14.38
Population (millions) 0.88 2.08
Share of neighborhoods that are low poverty 39.33 15.59
Region of the market (Mid-Atlantic reference)
Region 1  New England 0.04 0.20
Region 3  East North Central 0.16 0.37
Region 4  West North Central 0.10 0.30
Region 5  South Atlantic 0.19 0.39
Region 6  East South Central 0.09 0.28
Region 7  West South Central 0.15 0.36
Region 8  Mountain 0.08 0.28
Region 9  Pacific 0.10 0.30
Relative market softness
Vacancy in low-poverty neighborhoods minus vacancy in all neighborhoods – 0.57 2.85
Rental units less than FMR
Percent less than FMR in low-poverty neighborhoods minus all neighborhoods – 10.67 6.43
Ratio of FMR to median gross rent 0.99 0.07
FMR = Fair Market Rent. HCVP = Housing Choice Voucher Program.
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development HCVP data, 2010; 2005–09 American Community Survey
5-year data
2 The dissimilarity index is the sum of the absolute values of [{(Pi1/P1)-(Pi2/P2)}/2]x100, where Pi1 is the count of a refer-
ence population, such as Whites, in a tract; P1 is the count of the entire reference population, such as Whites in the metro-
politan area; Pi2 is the count of a comparison population, such as African Americans, in a tract; and P2 is the count of the 
entire comparison population, such as African Americans, in the metropolitan area. The index is interpreted as the percentage 
of the comparison population that would need to locate for the comparison population to be evenly distributed across all 




Finally, variables are entered that measure the availability of units rented for less than the ap-
plicable FMR. One variable measures the difference between the percentage of units available for 
less than the FMR in low-poverty neighborhoods and in the market as a whole. As with vacancy, 
if low-poverty areas have a greater proportion of rental units available for less than the FMR than 
elsewhere in the market, those neighborhoods are expected to attract more HCVP households. A 
second variable assesses the how much the FMR is relative to typical rents in the market. This vari-
able is the ratio of the FMR to the median gross rent in the metropolitan area. It is expected that 
the greater the ratio, the greater will be the entry of HCVP households into low-poverty areas.
Exhibit 8 lists the details of the various models.3 Model 1 explains the variation in HCVP entry into 
low-poverty neighborhoods for all HCVP households. The model is fairly sturdy, with an R-square 
statistic of 0.78. The outcomes for the control variables are informative.
The control variable that adds the greatest explanatory power to the model is the variable measur-
ing the percentage of neighborhoods in the metropolitan area that are low poverty. It suggests, 
unsurprisingly, that the greater the share of low-poverty tracts, the greater the entry by HCVP 
households. It is highly significant and unambiguous. If the housing market offers a large propor-
tion of its tracts as targets for location, an HCVP household is more likely to end up there.
Scale of the metropolitan area does not matter much when other controlling variables are entered 
into the model.
The market softness variable, the vacancy differential between low-poverty tracts and the market 
as a whole, is positive and significant. It suggests that HCVP households respond to market 
softness in an economically rational manner. If the market is softer inside the low-poverty tracts, 
then HCVP households will locate in these low-poverty tracts. If the market is softer outside the 
low-poverty tracts, then HCVP households will locate in higher poverty tracts. The coefficient for 
this variable indicates that tight markets in low-poverty tracts can inhibit HCVP households from 
locating in desirable tracts, and soft markets can facilitate the poverty deconcentration process.
Two variables examine the level of the applicable FMRs. These variables have particular signifi-
cance because the FMR is a component of the program that program administrators can adjust. 
The first variable indicates that greater entry is also associated with greater proportions of units 
offered for less than the FMR in low-poverty neighborhoods relative to the market as a whole. The 
second variable suggests that greater entry into low-poverty tracts is associated with FMRs being 
greater relative to the typical rents in a market. These two results both follow from expectations.
Models 2, 3, and 4 explain the variation in entry to low-poverty neighborhoods for White, African-
American, and Hispanic HCVP households. The models are less sturdy, with R-square statistics of 
0.68 for White, 0.68 for African-American, and 0.66 for Hispanic HCVP households, but they are 
3 Note that the models are weighted least squares models because the dependent variables are proportions. Because pro-
portions are constrained by a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1, they may introduce inconsistency into the model. This 
problem is not significant because the proportions are normally distributed around the means of 15 to 24 percent, with no 
significant frequencies at the extremes of 0 or 1. Because of the variation in the denominator of each dependent variable, the 
count of HCVP households in the metropolitan area, however, the cases are weighted as a function of this count.
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Exhibit 8
Models Explaning Variation in the Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-
Poverty Neighborhoods in Metropolitan Areas, by Race and Ethnicity
Model 3 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 
African- 
Variable All  White Hispanic  
American
HCVP HH HCVP HH HCVP HH
HCVP HH
Dependent variable Percent of all  
HCVP HH to 
neighborhoods  
with poverty less 
than 10%
Percent of White 
HCVP HH to 
neighborhoods  
with poverty less 
than 10%
Percent of African-
American HCVP HH 
to neighborhoods  









Scale of the market 
population (millions)
– 0.083 – 0.0343 0.101 – 0.083
Share of neighborhoods 
that are low poverty




– 0.209** 0.133* – 0.289** – 0.162*
Dissimilarity index: 
White-to-Hispanic
0.000 – 0.056 – 0.091 – 0.064
Region of the market 
(Mid-Atlantic reference)
1-New England 1.637 5.693* 0.674 – 3.820
3-East North Central 4.991** 4.403* 5.776** 12.804**
4-West North Central 4.215** 6.371** 4.545* 9.313**
5-South Atlantic 6.629** 3.459* 9.825** 21.258**
6-East South Central 7.574** 5.674* 10.372** 20.966**
7-West South Central 7.284** 3.357 10.666** 15.342**
8-Mountain 9.579** 8.803** 9.008** 13.452**
9-Pacific 8.205** 7.549** 3.923** 15.259**
Relative market softness
Vacancy in low-poverty 
neighborhoods minus 
vacancy in all neigh-
borhoods
0.441* 0.364 0.314 0.503
Rental units < FMR
Percent < FMR in 
low-poverty neigh-
borhoods minus all 
neighborhoods
0.333** 0.501** – 0.017 0.365**
Ratio of FMR to median 
gross rent
19.607** 32.831** 11.865 21.424**
Constant – 21.364 – 35.905 – 16.719 – 31.196
R square 0.782 0.679 0.677 0.656
No. of metropolitan areas 276 276 276 275
FMR = Fair Market Rent. HCVP = Housing Choice Voucher Program. HH = households.
*significant at .05. **significant at .01.




adequate to test some of the issues. The models for each racial or ethnic subpopulation generally 
work very similarly to the model for all HCVP households. The models for African Americans and 
Hispanics have much lower constants than is found in the models for Whites, indicating that racial 
or ethnic minorities enter low-poverty tracts less, independent of the other controlling factors in 
the models. In each model for Whites or minorities, the variable for the share of all neighborhoods 
that are low-poverty continues to contribute the greatest explanatory power. The dissimilarity index  
for the African American-to-White differential is significant for African-American HCVP households, 
as would be expected. The coefficient for the Hispanic-to-White index is not significant for Hispanic 
HCVP households, which is unexpected. The coefficients for the two variables describing the relative  
and absolute levels of the FMRs are significant for Hispanics and for Whites, as was true for the total 
population of HCVP households. These coefficients are not significant in the model for African 
Americans, which suggests that modifications to the FMRs may be more effective in generating 
poverty deconcentration for Whites and Hispanics and less so for African Americans.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The HCVP is achieving much, but it could achieve more. HCVP households are not making entry into 
low-poverty tracts at levels that might be expected. Their entry is not even up to the share of units with 
rents less than the FMR. What causes these less-than-expected levels of market entry is unclear.
Unmeasured in this analysis is the capacity of HCVP households to compete for available units 
in low-poverty neighborhoods. It is possible that the asymmetric market power of upper-income 
households is at fault. Upper-income households have the option to spend a lower percentage 
of their income on housing. They can compete very well for low-priced rental units in desirable 
neighborhoods. Landlords will generally prefer a higher income household when choosing between  
two households applying for a lease. The higher level of income better insulates the household from  
problems in making rent payments should the flow of that income be interrupted. The competition 
between HCVP households and other, especially upper-income, households could be greater in 
low-poverty neighborhoods, thereby pushing HCVP households out of these neighborhoods. It  
is also possible that landlord resistance to accepting a housing choice voucher as a means of pay-
ment may be greater in low-poverty neighborhoods. Landlords in low-poverty neighborhoods will 
generally have greater capacity to refuse a voucher applicant, knowing that a non-HCVP household 
will likely come along. Landlords are beginning to lose this capacity, however, as states and com-
munities adopt prohibitions on source-of-income discrimination. These laws effectively prohibit 
a landlord from refusing an application from an HCVP household solely because of the use of a 
voucher. Landlord resistance and increased competition for units, however, can push down the 
percentage of HCVP households that can successfully enter low-poverty neighborhoods.
We learn from the analysis of metropolitan markets that White HCVP households can overcome 
these barriers, entering low-poverty neighborhoods at a rate greater than the share of units offered 
at rents less than the FMR limits. This finding means that HCVP households can successfully seek 
out, negotiate for, and lease these units, perhaps because racial barriers do not stand in their way. 
For White HCVP households to be found in low-poverty neighborhoods in greater proportion than 
the share of units available for less than the FMR means that landlord resistance and competition 
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from higher income households is not prohibitive. The promise of the HCVP is to augment 
the incomes of extremely low-income households such that they can enter into the market for 
good-quality housing. A significant share of HCVP households is evidently realizing this promise. 
Barriers appear to exist for racial and ethnic minorities. The data available here do not permit us 
to know the extent to which these barriers result from self-selection by minority households, from 
actual discrimination, or from fear of confronting discrimination. Whatever the source or sources, 
racial differences in the ability of HCVP households to enter low-poverty tracts are large.
The analysis indicates that the level of the FMR does influence the success with which HCVP 
households enter low-poverty neighborhoods. The models indicate, with some ambiguity, that if 
FMRs were raised so that the share of units in low-poverty neighborhoods offered for less than the 
FMR could be increased, then the share of HCVP households that locate there would rise. Selective 
adjustments to the FMRs must be done with care, however, recognizing the local market forces 
that influence the availability of units in high-opportunity tracts. The analysis in this article is per-
formed at the level of census tracts, which may be too large a spatial unit for identifying neighbor-
hoods. The analysis suggests that, if it is desirable to facilitate entry into low-poverty tracts, then 
FMRs should be raised in these tracts, and perhaps even in smaller neighborhoods, and not in in 
the moderate- or high-poverty tracts which may be harmed by the presence of additional poverty.
As we learn more about the ability of the HCVP to help poor households locate into good-quality 
housing in opportunity-rich tracts, it appears the voucher households can compete well. Race and 
ethnicity remain forces that separate people. The research reported here, however, suggests that 
HUD can facilitate the process by selectively altering the FMR in target neighborhoods. The results 
presented here indicate that small-area FMRs hold promise. FMRs set for a spatial unit much 
smaller than a metropolitan area, if carefully implemented, can increase the number of rental units 
that qualify for placing HCVP households into high-opportunity neighborhoods. Such small-area 
FMRs will improve the capacity of the HCVP to deconcentrate poor households, but they are not 
a panacea. Other actions may need to be explored and adopted. Metropolitan area administration 
of the HCVP could increase the information flow on available units to households. More intensive 
housing counseling is a proven technique that can help guide HCVP households to high-opportunity 
neighborhoods. Enforcing fair housing laws can help racial and ethnic minorities gain access to  
markets previously closed to them. All these approaches have merit. The evidence from this research 
indicates that carefully adjusting FMR levels can increase poverty deconcentration with minimal 
effect on the program budget. Raising FMRs, however, unfortunately does distribute the available 
program funds across a smaller number of participating households. Further study is needed to 
determine whether the beneficial effects of helping HCVP households into low-poverty tracts justify 






Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-Poverty Neighborhoods for 
Metropolitan Areas (1 of 6)
Metropolitan Area
Percent of HCVP Households to 
Low-Poverty Tracts
Abilene, TX MSA 2.42
Albany, GA MSA 10.47
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY MSA 29.83
Albuquerque, NM MSA 16.53
Alexandria, LA MSA 4.82
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA MSA 32.87
Altoona, PA MSA 19.58
Amarillo, TX MSA 23.42
Anchorage, AK MSA 32.17
Anniston, AL MSA 9.01
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI MSA 42.16
Asheville, NC MSA 22.73
Athens, GA MSA 5.98
Atlanta, GA MSA 18.34
Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA 19.33
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA 2.28
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA 26.76
Bakersfield, CA MSA 5.19
Bangor, ME MSA 13.31
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA MSA 67.06
Baton Rouge, LA MSA 15.32
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX MSA 10.59
Bellingham, WA MSA 19.68
Benton Harbor, MI MSA 2.75
Billings, MT MSA 21.89
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS MSA 17.86
Binghamton, NY MSA 16.55
Birmingham, AL MSA 10.84
Bismarck, ND MSA 67.75
Bloomington, IN MSA 9.16
Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 20.09
Boise City, ID MSA 28.07
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT CMSA 36.87
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX MSA .51
Bryan-College Station, TX MSA 3.37
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA 12.96
Burlington, VT MSA 34.79
Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 17.23
Casper, WY MSA 32.72
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 39.33
Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 5.99
Charleston, WV MSA 18.00
Charleston-North Charleston, SC MSA 14.57
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA 17.36
Charlottesville, VA MSA 56.33
Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA 15.79
Cheyenne, WY MSA 53.46
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI CMSA 22.45
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Exhibit A1
Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-Poverty Neighborhoods for 
Metropolitan Areas (2 of 6)
Metropolitan Area
Percent of HCVP Households to 
Low-Poverty Tracts
Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 16.67
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN CMSA 19.96
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY MSA 10.63
Cleveland-Akron, OH CMSA 17.65
Colorado Springs, CO MSA 29.62
Columbia, MO MSA 14.23
Columbia, SC MSA 23.62
Columbus, GA-AL MSA 6.98
Columbus, OH MSA 17.47
Corpus Christi, TX MSA 6.54
Corvallis, OR MSA 8.26
Cumberland, MD-WV MSA 18.59
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CMSA 18.48
Danville, VA MSA 7.95
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL MSA 23.53
20.62
Daytona Beach, FL MSA 21.66
Decatur, AL MSA 1.30
Decatur, IL MSA 12.41
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO CMSA 23.20
Des Moines, IA MSA 38.71
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI CMSA 19.01
Dothan, AL MSA 8.09
Dover, DE MSA 19.48
Dubuque, IA MSA 43.04
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI MSA 11.97
Eau Claire, WI MSA 38.19
El Paso, TX MSA 1.38
Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 30.61
Elmira, NY MSA 4.39
Enid, OK MSA 19.49
Erie, PA MSA 17.67
17.59
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY MSA 13.68
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA 26.60
Fayetteville, NC MSA 7.18
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR MSA 19.72
Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA 32.29
Florence, AL MSA 15.77
Florence, SC MSA 11.28
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO MSA 30.70
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL MSA 33.46
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL MSA 23.00
Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 3.53
Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 23.98





Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-Poverty Neighborhoods for 
Metropolitan Areas (3 of 6)
Metropolitan Area
Percent of HCVP Households to 
Low-Poverty Tracts
Fresno, CA MSA 6.73
Gadsden, AL MSA 17.95
Gainesville, FL MSA 7.75
Glens Falls, NY MSA 16.83
Goldsboro, NC MSA 11.11
Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA 5.16
Grand Junction, CO MSA 15.04
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI MSA 20.59
Great Falls, MT MSA 16.97
Green Bay, WI MSA 33.56
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA 14.03
Greenville, NC MSA 3.87
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC MSA 18.50
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA 42.37
Hartford, CT MSA 23.86
Hattiesburg, MS MSA 4.83
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC MSA 15.58
Honolulu, HI MSA 40.41
Houma, LA MSA 14.36
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX CMSA 13.24
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH MSA 11.43
Huntsville, AL MSA 22.31
Indianapolis, IN MSA 15.11
Iowa City, IA MSA 28.47
Jackson, MI MSA 13.30
Jackson, MS MSA 7.39
Jackson, TN MSA 11.33
Jacksonville, FL MSA 21.38
Jacksonville, NC MSA 8.98
Jamestown, NY MSA 10.64
Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 31.17
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA MSA 8.81
Johnstown, PA MSA 19.03
Jonesboro, AR MSA 12.18
Joplin, MO MSA 3.81
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI MSA 9.38
Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 25.32
Killeen-Temple, TX MSA 13.32
Knoxville, TN MSA 12.44
Kokomo, IN MSA 10.54
La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 38.79
Lafayette, IN MSA 16.93
Lafayette, LA MSA 5.08
Lake Charles, LA MSA 11.87
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL MSA 25.35
Lancaster, PA MSA 28.64
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Exhibit A1
Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-Poverty Neighborhoods for 
Metropolitan Areas (4 of 6)
Metropolitan Area
Percent of HCVP Households to 
Low-Poverty Tracts
Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA 16.60
Laredo, TX MSA 2.87
Las Cruces, NM MSA .35
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA 43.50
Lawrence, KS MSA 20.88
Lawton, OK MSA 6.71
Lewiston-Auburn, ME MSA 7.86
Lexington, KY MSA 15.44
Lima, OH MSA 8.82
Lincoln, NE MSA 19.55
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR MSA 17.03
Longview-Marshall, TX MSA 9.28
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA CMSA 20.81
Louisville, KY-IN MSA 13.32
Lubbock, TX MSA 9.54
Lynchburg, VA MSA 5.26
Macon, GA MSA 13.77
Madison, WI MSA 38.59
17.65
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX MSA .69
Medford-Ashland, OR MSA 6.06
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL MSA 32.67
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 10.02
Merced, CA MSA 1.94
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA 10.77
Milwaukee-Racine, WI CMSA 23.53
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA 34.19
Missoula, MT MSA 4.61
Mobile, AL MSA 7.15
Modesto, CA MSA 34.95
Monroe, LA MSA 10.41
Montgomery, AL MSA 13.55
Muncie, IN MSA 18.98
Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 13.46
Naples, FL MSA 34.44
Nashville, TN MSA 18.47
New London-Norwich, CT-RI MSA 44.86
New Orleans, LA MSA 9.42
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT MSA 19.25
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA-NC MSA 26.73
Ocala, FL MSA 10.36
Odessa-Midland, TX MSA 8.30
Oklahoma City, OK MSA 12.08
Omaha, NE-IA MSA 22.14
Orlando, FL MSA 21.07





Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-Poverty Neighborhoods for 
Metropolitan Areas (5 of 6)
Metropolitan Area
Percent of HCVP Households to 
Low-Poverty Tracts
Panama City, FL MSA 23.29
Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH MSA 10.22
Pensacola, FL MSA 9.78
Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA 31.50
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD 22.41
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 22.63
Pine Bluff, AR MSA 2.82
Pittsburgh, PA MSA 17.39
21.11
Pocatello, ID MSA 19.88
Portland, ME MSA 29.67
Portland-Salem, OR-WA CMSA 19.09
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA MSA 26.53
Provo-Orem, UT MSA 32.22
Pueblo, CO MSA 12.96
Punta Gorda, FL MSA 38.63
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA 28.90
Rapid City, SD MSA 9.71
Reading, PA MSA 30.17
Redding, CA MSA 4.62
Reno, NV MSA 18.20
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA MSA 22.29
Richmond-Petersburg, VA MSA 34.15
Roanoke, VA MSA 14.69
Rochester, MN MSA 42.80
Rochester, NY MSA 26.05
Rockford, IL MSA 16.18
Rocky Mount, NC MSA 3.59
Sacramento-Yolo, CA CMSA 28.97
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI MSA 7.61
St. Cloud, MN MSA 27.93
St. Joseph, MO MSA 16.33
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 20.40
Salinas, CA MSA 17.44
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 35.19
San Angelo, TX MSA 4.91
San Antonio, TX MSA 6.10
San Diego, CA MSA 32.19
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA CMSA 42.62
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA MSA 41.11
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA MSA 24.10
Santa Fe, NM MSA 18.19
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA 24.14
Savannah, GA MSA 15.51
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA MSA 20.23
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA CMSA 29.45
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Exhibit A1
Percent of HCVP Households Locating in Low-Poverty Neighborhoods for 
Metropolitan Areas (6 of 6)
Metropolitan Area
Percent of HCVP Households to 
Low-Poverty Tracts
Sharon, PA MSA 20.06
Sheboygan, WI MSA 40.51
Sherman-Denison, TX MSA 27.01
Shreveport-Bossier, LA MSA 9.77
Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 11.39
Sioux Falls, SD MSA 37.43
South Bend, IN MSA 8.72




State College, PA MSA 52.87
Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV MSA 17.48
Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 17.04
Sumter, SC MSA 9.43
Syracuse, NY MSA 17.09
Tallahassee, FL MSA 12.36
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA 20.15
Terre Haute, IN MSA 7.93
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR MSA 12.27
Toledo, OH MSA 12.63
Topeka, KS MSA 20.20
Tucson, AZ MSA 11.43
Tulsa, OK MSA 8.91
Tuscaloosa, AL MSA 12.62
Tyler, TX MSA 24.73
Utica-Rome, NY MSA 18.55
Victoria, TX MSA 5.45
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA MSA 15.29
Waco, TX MSA 5.76
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV CMSA 43.80
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 18.73
Wausau, WI MSA 33.99
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA 17.62
Wheeling, WV-OH MSA 15.11
Wichita, KS MSA 17.39
Wichita Falls, TX MSA 25.62
Williamsport, PA MSA 13.49
Wilmington, NC MSA 12.27
Yakima, WA MSA 8.72
York, PA MSA 29.34
Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA 7.57
Yuba City, CA MSA 11.97
Yuma, AZ MSA .79






Kirk McClure is a professor in the Department of Urban Planning at The University of Kansas.
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